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II. Commerce Clause.

1. *Exportation of hydroelectric energy—Validity of state statute.*—New Hampshire statute prohibiting a hydroelectric energy corporation from transmitting such energy out of State unless approved by New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, which can withhold approval if it determines that such energy is needed within State, conflicts with Commerce Clause, and saving clause of Federal Power Act does not provide an affirmative grant of authority for such state action. *New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire*, p. 331.

2. *Oil and gas leases—Indian reservation—Validity of severance tax.*—Respondent Indian Tribe's imposition of severance tax—pursuant to ordinance approved by Secretary of Interior—on oil and gas production on tribal reservation lands by petitioners as Tribe's lessees under mineral leases approved by Secretary does not violate Commerce Clause and is within Tribe's inherent power to govern and to pay for costs of self-government. *Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe*, p. 130.

III. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Death penalty—Consideration of mitigating factors.—Where petitioner, who was 16 years old at time of offense, was convicted of first-degree murder, and where trial judge, in imposing death sentence, refused as a matter of law to consider petitioner's evidence at sentencing hearing concerning his unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance, death sentence must be vacated as it was imposed without type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases. *Eddings v. Oklahoma*, p. 104.

IV. Due Process.

1. *Defendant's postarrest silence—Use for impeachment purposes.*—In state-court trial resulting in manslaughter conviction, due process was not denied by prosecutor's use of defendant's postarrest silence for impeachment purposes after defendant testified—asserting self-defense and accidental stabbing for first time—where record did not indicate that defendant had been given *Miranda* warnings during period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest. *Fletcher v. Weir*, p. 603.

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2. *Employment discrimination—Failure of state agency to act within statutory period—Effect on employee's rights.*—Under Illinois statute which barred employment discrimination on basis of physical handicap unrelated to ability and which required Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission to convene factfinding conference within 120 days from receipt of an employee's charge against his employer, Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of statute as requiring dismissal of an employee's charge when Commission failed to comply with 120-day convening requirement violates employee's rights under Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment. *Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.*, p. 422.

3. *Right to fair trial—Conduct of juror and prosecuting attorneys.*—Respondent, who was convicted of murder in state prosecution, was not denied due process by conduct of juror, who, during trial, submitted an application for employment as an investigator in District Attorney's Office, or by conduct of prosecuting attorneys, who withheld information about juror from trial court and defense counsel until after trial. *Smith v. Phillips*, p. 209.

4. *Termination of parental rights—Standard of proof.*—Under Fourteenth Amendment, a State must provide natural parents fundamentally fair procedures at state-initiated neglect proceedings to terminate parental rights in their natural child, and due process requires that State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence, not just a fair preponderance of evidence. *Santosky v. Kramer*, p. 745.

5. *Vagueness of ordinance—License for coin-operated amusement establishment.*—A city ordinance directing that Chief of Police consider whether applicant for license for coin-operated amusement establishment has any "connections with criminal elements" before Chief of Police makes recommendations to City Manager, who decides whether to grant a license, is not unconstitutionally vague. *City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.*, p. 283.

V. Equal Protection of the Laws.

Limitation of actions—Foreign corporations—Validity of state statute tolling limitation period.—A New Jersey statute which tolls limitation period for an action against a foreign corporation that is not represented in State by any person upon whom process may be served does not violate Equal Protection Clause notwithstanding subsequent institution of long-arm jurisdiction in New Jersey; however, Court of Appeals' judgment upholding validity of tolling statute is vacated, and case is remanded for initial consideration of whether statute violates Commerce Clause. *G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn*, p. 404.

VI. Freedom of Religion.

Social security taxes—Members of Amish faith.—Imposition of social security taxes is not unconstitutional as applied to such persons as appel-

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lee—a member of Old Order Amish who employed other Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop—who object on religious grounds to receipt of public insurance benefits and to payment of taxes to support public insurance funds. *United States v. Lee*, p. 252.

VII. Freedom of Speech.

1. *Advertising by lawyers—Validity of restrictions.*—Where Missouri Supreme Court Rule specified areas of practice that could be included in lawyers' advertisements and limited persons to whom professional announcement cards could be sent, and where appellant lawyer received a private reprimand in a disciplinary action resulting from his having (1) published advertisements that listed areas of practice in language other than as specified in Rule, and that listed courts in which he was admitted to practice (information not authorized under Rule), and (2) mailed announcement cards to persons not specified in Rule, such restrictions upon appellant's First Amendment rights could not be sustained. *In re R. M. J.*, p. 191.

2. *License to sell drug paraphernalia—Validity of ordinance.*—A village ordinance requiring a business to obtain a license to sell items that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs" does not violate First Amendment and is not facially overbroad or vague. *Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.*, p. 489.

VIII. Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Rehabilitation proceedings—Indiana court judgments—Effect in North Carolina courts.—Where Indiana state court, in rehabilitation proceedings against petitioner Indiana insurance company, entered judgments holding that it had jurisdiction over parties and over funds deposited by petitioner with North Carolina Commissioner of Insurance for protection of petitioner's North Carolina policyholders, and that all claims to North Carolina deposit were compromised and settled by court's adoption of a rehabilitation plan, and where in meantime respondent North Carolina association—to which petitioner was required to belong and which under North Carolina law was responsible for fulfilling insolvent members' policy obligations—sought a declaratory judgment in a North Carolina state court to establish that it was entitled to use North Carolina deposit to fulfill pre-rehabilitation obligations to North Carolina policyholders, North Carolina courts violated Full Faith and Credit Clause by refusing to treat Indiana court's judgments as *res judicata*. *Underwriters National Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn.*, p. 691.

IX. Right to Counsel.

Effective assistance—Failure to file timely application for certiorari in state court.—State criminal defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel by latter's filing of an untimely application for certiorari in Florida Supreme Court to review Florida Court of Appeal's affirmance of

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conviction where review by Florida Supreme Court was discretionary. *Wainwright v. Torna*, p. 586.

X. Searches and Seizures.

Arrest of university student—Seizure of contraband in dormitory room.—Fourth Amendment was not violated where a university police officer, after arresting a student and accompanying him to his dormitory room to retrieve his identification, (1) observed marihuana seeds and a pipe in plain view in room while waiting in doorway, (2) then entered room, and (3) after student and his roommate waived their *Miranda* rights, was given a box containing more marihuana and cash, and where more marihuana and another controlled substance were discovered upon search of room to which students consented. *Washington v. Chrisman*, p. 1.

XI. States' Powers.

Operation of railroad—Applicability of Railway Labor Act.—Where New York State acquired an interstate railroad from private owners, application to railroad of Railway Labor Act's provisions regulating labor relations in railroad industry does not so impair State's ability to carry out its constitutionally preserved sovereign function as to conflict with Tenth Amendment, and labor dispute between union and railroad was not covered by state law prohibiting strikes by public employees. *Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co.*, p. 678.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY EMPLOYER TO EMPLOYEE HEALTH AND RETIREMENT FUNDS. See Antitrust Acts, 1; National Labor Relations Act.

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CORPORATE INCOME TAXES. See Internal Revenue Code, 2.

CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, III; IV, 1, 3; IX; X; Habeas Corpus; Jurisdiction; Mootness, 2, 4.

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- CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.** See Constitutional Law, III.
- CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 4.
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- DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 2.
- DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN.** See Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING.** See Fair Housing Act of 1968; Mootness, 1.
- DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL LITERATURE ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUS.** See Jurisdiction.
- DORMITORY ROOM SEARCHES.** See Constitutional Law, X.
- DUE PROCESS.** See Constitutional Law, IV; VII, 2; Mootness, 2, 5.
- EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.** See Constitutional Law, IX.
- EIGHTH AMENDMENT.** See Constitutional Law, III; Mootness, 4.
- ELECTIONS.** See Stays.
- ELECTRIC ENERGY.** See Constitutional Law, II, 1.
- EMERGENCY PETROLEUM ALLOCATION ACT.** See Federal-State Relations, 2.
- EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE AS MITIGATING AGAINST DEATH PENALTY.** See Constitutional Law, III.
- EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES.** See Antitrust Acts, 1; Civil Rights Act of 1964; Constitutional Law, I; IV, 2; VI; XI; Internal Revenue Code, 1; Labor Management Relations Act; Mootness, 3; National Labor Relations Act.

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EXEMPTIONS FROM INCOME TAXES. See Internal Revenue Code, 2.

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EXPORTATION OF HYDROELECTRIC ENERGY. See Constitutional Law, II, 1.

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Racial discrimination in housing—Standing to sue—Limitation of actions.—A black person employed as a “tester” by a corporation organized to ensure equal housing opportunity has standing to sue under Act in capacity as a “tester” on basis of alleged misrepresentation by apartment complex owner and its employee that apartments were not available, but such claim was time barred under Act’s requirement that suit be brought within 180 days after alleged discriminatory act; a white person, also employed by corporation, has no standing to sue in “tester” capacity since he alleged that he was informed that apartments *were* available; both individual testers’ claims, as area residents, that defendants’ alleged acts deprived them of benefits of interracial association were not subject to dismissal on pretrial motion, and were not time barred since they were based on a “continuing” violation extending into 180-day period; and corporation has standing to sue for damages on asserted basis that defendants’ alleged acts injured corporation’s housing counseling and referral services, with a consequent drain on its resources, and such claim is not barred since it was based on a “continuing” violation theory. *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, p. 363.

FAIR TRIALS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 3.

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FEDERAL GIFT TAXES.

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AS INDEPENDENT TAXABLE ENTITIES. See *Federal-State Relations*, 1.**FEDERAL INCOME TAXES.** See *Internal Revenue Code*, 2.**FEDERAL POWER ACT.** See *Constitutional Law*, II, 1.**FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.** See *Census Act*; *Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976*.**FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS.** See also *Antitrust Acts*, 2; *Constitutional Law*, II, 1; XI; *Habeas Corpus*; *Social Security Act*; *Stays*.

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2. *State gross receipts tax—Pre-emption by federal law—Expiration of federal law.*—Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals' judgment—affirming District Court's decision that New York statute prohibiting oil companies from passing on cost of New York's gross receipts tax on revenues derived from activities within State in prices of their products sold in State was pre-empted by federal price control authority under Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act—was vacated, and case was remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent expiration of federal price control authority. *Tully v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, p. 245.

- FIFTH AMENDMENT.** See Jurisdiction.
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2. *Federal relief—State-court findings of fact—Presumption of correctness.*—In federal habeas corpus proceedings challenging state conviction, constitutionality of pretrial photographic identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact that is not governed by 28 U. S. C. § 2254, which requires federal habeas courts to presume correctness of state-court findings of fact unless specified factors are present, but questions of fact that underlie ultimate conclusion are governed by statutory presumption. *Sumner v. Mata*, p. 591.
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1. *Social security taxes—Exemption—Self-employed Amish.*—Exemption under § 1402(g) of Code of self-employed Amish and others from payment of social security taxes was not applicable to appellee, a member of Old Order Amish, and his employees, other Amish who worked on appellee's farm and in his carpentry shop. *United States v. Lee*, p. 252.
 2. *Surtax exemption—"Controlled group of corporations."*—Code provisions limiting a "controlled group of corporations" to a single surtax exemption and defining such a group as including a "brother-sister controlled group," as determined by ownership of specified percentages of corporations' stock by five or fewer persons, apply only where each person whose stock is taken into account owns stock in each corporation of group, and implementing Treasury Regulation to contrary is invalid. *United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.*, p. 16.
- INTERSTATE COMMERCE.** See Constitutional Law, II; Criminal Law.
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- JURISDICTION.** See also Constitutional Law, V; VIII; Mootness, 5.
- Supreme Court—Appeal from State Supreme Court—Reversal of trespass conviction.*—Appeal to this Court from New Jersey Supreme Court's judgment—which reversed appellee's trespass conviction based on his distributing political materials on a university campus without having first

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received permission from university officials as required by a university regulation—is dismissed for want of jurisdiction where (1) State, while joining in university's jurisdictional statement, declined to take a position on merits in its brief, asking only that issues be decided, and (2) university lacked standing to invoke this Court's jurisdiction because of mootness, having amended its pertinent regulations while appeal was pending and State Supreme Court not having passed on validity of revised regulations. *Princeton University v. Schmid*, p. 100.

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spondent's employment had not in fact occurred, Court of Appeals erred (1) in presuming under § 20(a) of Act that claim fell within Act's provisions on theory that injury occurred on morning after alleged accident when respondent awoke with pain, and (2) in its use of term "injury" as including such attack of pain. *U. S. Industries/Federal Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP*, p. 608.

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1. *Action under Fair Housing Act of 1968—Effect of consent order and agreement liquidating damages.*—In an action under Fair Housing Act of 1968 against petitioners, an apartment complex owner and one of its employees for alleged "racial steering" in rental of apartments, claims of respondents, a corporation organized to ensure equal housing opportunity and two "testers" employed by it, were not rendered moot by either (1) District Court's entry of a consent order granting relief to another plaintiff, a black person who attempted to rent an apartment but was allegedly falsely told none were available, or (2) an agreement between petitioners and respondents—reached prior to grant of certiorari—liquidating respondents' damages if certiorari was denied or if lower court's judgment was affirmed upon review. *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, p. 363.

2. *Mandatory parole term—Expiration as affecting constitutional challenge.*—Respondents' claims, asserted in federal habeas corpus proceedings, that they were denied due process when, in their guilty plea acceptance hearings in Illinois burglary prosecutions, neither was informed that his negotiated sentence included a mandatory 3-year parole term, were moot where (1) their habeas corpus petitions were filed after they had completed their prison terms and after they had been reincarcerated for parole violation, (2) District Court ultimately declared their mandatory parole terms void, respondents having already been discharged from custody since their parole terms had expired, and (3) respondents had not sought to

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have their convictions set aside and to plead anew, but instead elected to attack only their sentences. *Lane v. Williams*, p. 624.

3. *Reorganization of railroad—Enactment of Staggers Rail Act—Mootness of preliminary injunction.*—In bankruptcy reorganization proceedings by Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. where court ordered abandonment of Railroad's system, disallowed any claim or arrangement for employee labor protection payable out of Railroad assets, and issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act's provisions requiring trustee of Railroad's estate to pay benefits to Railroad's employees who were not hired by other carriers and providing for guarantee by United States of Railroad's employee protection obligations, injunction was rendered moot by subsequent enactment of Staggers Rail Act of 1980. *Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Gibbons*, p. 457.

4. *State criminal prosecution—Denial of pretrial bail—Effect of conviction.*—Where appellee, pending trial on state sexual-offense charges, filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on ground that his federal constitutional rights were violated by a Nebraska constitutional provision prohibiting bail in certain cases of first-degree sexual offenses, such as appellee's, and where appellee was convicted in state prosecutions before Court of Appeals, in reversing District Court's dismissal of complaint, held that exclusion of violent sexual offenses from pretrial bail violated Excessive Bail Clause of Eighth Amendment, appellee's constitutional claim became moot following his state-court convictions. *Murphy v. Hunt*, p. 478.

5. *Validity of ordinance—Amendment pending appeal.*—In an action where District Court held unconstitutional for vagueness a city ordinance directing that consideration be given to any "connections with criminal elements" of applicants for license for coin-operated amusement establishments, case is not rendered moot by fact that quoted phrase was eliminated from ordinance while case was pending in Court of Appeals. *City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.*, p. 283.

MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1980. See Antitrust Acts, 1; National Labor Relations Act.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.

Collective-bargaining agreement—Employee health and retirement funds—Employer contributions.—In an action to enforce collective-bargaining provision whereby petitioner coal producer, as a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit, agreed to contribute to employee health and retirement funds on basis of its purchases of coal from producers not under contract with union, petitioner was entitled to plead and have adjudicated its defense based on alleged illegality of contract provision under § 8(e) of Act. *Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins*, p. 72.

- NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978.** See Constitutional Law, II, 2.
- NEBRASKA.** See Mootness, 4.
- NEGLECT OF CHILDREN.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 4.
- NEW HAMPSHIRE.** See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976; Constitutional Law, II, 1.
- NEW JERSEY.** See Constitutional Law, V; Stays, 2.
- NEW MEXICO.** See Federal-State Relations, 1.
- NEW YORK.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 3, 4; XI; Federal-State Relations, 2.
- NORTH CAROLINA.** See Constitutional Law, VIII.
- OIL.** See Constitutional Law, II, 2; Federal-State Relations, 2.
- OKLAHOMA.** See Constitutional Law, III.
- PARAPHERNALIA USED WITH ILLEGAL DRUGS.** See Constitutional Law, VII, 2.
- PARENT AND CHILD.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 4.
- PAROLE.** See Mootness, 2.
- PENSION FUNDS.** See Antitrust Acts, 1; Labor Management Relations Act; National Labor Relations Act.
- PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION.** See Habeas Corpus, 2.
- "PLAIN-VIEW" EXCEPTION.** See Constitutional Law, X.
- PLEA BARGAINING.** See Mootness, 2.
- POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES.** See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
- POSTARREST SILENCE AS ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 1.
- PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW BY FEDERAL LAW.** See Federal-State Relations, 2.
- PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS.** See Mootness, 3.
- PRESUMPTIONS.** See Habeas Corpus, 2; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
- PRETRIAL BAIL.** See Mootness, 4.
- PRIMARY ELECTIONS.** See Stays.
- PRIVILEGED INFORMATION.** See Census Act.
- PROFESSIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT CARDS OF LAWYERS.** See Constitutional Law, VII, 1.
- PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.** See Constitutional Law, IV, 3.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. See Census Act.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, XI.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING. See Fair Housing Act of 1968; Mootness, 1.

RAILROADS. See Constitutional Law, I; XI; Mootness, 3.

RAILWAY LABOR ACT. See Constitutional Law, XI.

REAPPORTIONMENT. See Stays.

REFERENDUMS. See Stays, 1.

REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. See Constitutional Law, VI.

REORGANIZATION OF RAILROADS. See Constitutional Law, I; Mootness, 3.

RES JUDICATA. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

RIGHT TO BAIL. See Mootness, 4.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, IX.

RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL. See Constitutional Law, IV, 3.

ROCK ISLAND RAILROAD TRANSITION AND EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE ACT. See Constitutional Law, 1; Mootness, 3.

ROOM SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, X.

SALE OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. See Constitutional Law, VII, 2.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, X.

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934. See Securities Regulation.

SECURITIES REGULATION.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Antifraud provisions—What constitutes a “security.”—Where respondents (1) purchased a certificate of deposit from petitioner bank and pledged it to bank to guarantee loan by bank to a company that already owed bank on earlier debts, and (2) entered into agreement with debtor company entitling respondents to a share of company's profits in consideration for guaranteeing new loan, and where bank officers had told respondents that debtor company would use new loan as working capital but loan was instead applied to pay company's overdue obligations to bank, neither certificate of deposit nor agreement between respondents and debtor company was a “security” within meaning of anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934. *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, p. 551.

SELF-EMPLOYED AMISH. See Internal Revenue Code, 1.

SENIORITY RIGHTS. See Civil Rights Act of 1964.

SEVERANCE TAXES IMPOSED BY INDIAN TRIBES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

SEX DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964.

SEXUAL OFFENSES. See Mootness, 4.

SHERMAN ACT. See Antitrust Acts.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.

Eligibility for Medicaid—"Deeming" spouse's income as available to applicant.—District Court's order prohibiting Iowa from "deeming" income of spouse in determining Medicaid applicant's eligibility and requiring factual determination in each instance of amount of spouse's income actually available to applicant conflicts with Act's provisions; and federal regulations that impose time limitations upon State's ability to "deem" income between spouses who do not share same household are not precluded by Act. *Herweg v. Ray*, p. 265.

SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES. See Constitutional Law VI; Internal Revenue Code, 1.

SOLICITATION OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.

SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS OF STATES. See Constitutional Law, XI.

SOVEREIGNTY OF INDIAN TRIBES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

SPOUSE'S INCOME AS AFFECTING MEDICAID APPLICANT'S ELIGIBILITY. See Social Security Act.

STAGGERS RAIL ACT OF 1980. See Constitutional Law, I; Mootness, 3.

STANDING TO SUE. See Fair Housing Act of 1968.

"STATE ACTION" EXEMPTION FROM ANTITRUST LAWS. See Antitrust Acts, 2.

STATE EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, XI.

STATE GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES. See Federal-State Relations.

STATE-OWNED RAILROADS. See Constitutional Law, XI.

STATE USE TAXES. See Federal-State Relations, 1.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See Constitutional Law, V; Fair Housing Act of 1968.

STAYS.

1. *California Supreme Court judgment—Redistricting congressional districts.*—Application to stay California Supreme Court's judgment, holding that a statewide referendum petition effectively suspended operation of state statutes redistricting congressional districts but that upcoming pri-

STAYS—Continued.

mary election should be conducted in accordance with districts established by such statutes, is denied. *Republican National Committee v. Burton* (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers), p. 1301.

2. *District Court judgment—Redistricting congressional districts.*—Application to stay District Court's judgment declaring unconstitutional, because of population variances, a New Jersey statute creating new congressional districts and enjoining any primary or general elections under statute, is granted. *Karcher v. Daggett* (BRENNAN, J., in chambers), p. 1303.

STRIKES BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. See Constitutional Law, XI.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

SUPREME COURT. See Jurisdiction.

SURTAX EXEMPTIONS. See Internal Revenue Code, 2.

TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; VI; Federal Gift Taxes; Federal-State Relations; Internal Revenue Code.

TELEVISION. See Antitrust Acts, 2.

TENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, XI.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 4.

TOLLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See Constitutional Law, V.

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.

"TRANSFER" OF PROPERTY BY WILL. See Federal Gift Taxes.

TRANSPORTATION OF FORGED SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Criminal Law.

TREASURY REGULATIONS. See Federal Gift Taxes; Internal Revenue Code, 2.

TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.

UNIONS. See Antitrust Acts, 1; Civil Rights Act of 1964; Constitutional Law, XI; Labor Management Relations Act; National Labor Relations Act.

UNIVERSITY'S REGULATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE. See Jurisdiction.

USE TAXES. See Federal-State Relations, 1.

VAGUENESS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 5; VII, 2; Mootness, 5.

WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, X.

WASHINGTON. See Constitutional Law, X.

WELFARE BENEFITS. See Social Security Act.

WIDOWS' HEALTH BENEFITS. See Labor Management Relations Act.

WITNESSES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. "*Brother-sister controlled group.*" § 1563(a)(2), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 1563(a)(2). United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., p. 16.

2. "*Controlled group of corporations.*" §§ 1561(a), 1563(a)(2), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1561(a), 1563(a)(2). United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., p. 16.

3. "*Injury.*" § 2(2), Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 902(2). U. S. Industries/Federal Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, p. 608.

4. "*Interstate . . . commerce.*" 18 U. S. C. § 2314. McElroy v. United States, p. 642.

5. "*Security.*" § 10(b), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b). Marine Bank v. Weaver, p. 551.

6. "*Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.*" Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3). Baldrige v. Shapiro, p. 345.